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Abstract Detection of malware-infected computers and detection of malicious web
domains based on their encrypted HTTPS traffic are challenging problems, because
only addresses, timestamps, and data volumes are observable. The detection problems
are coupled, because infected clients tend to interact with malicious domains. Traffic
data can be collected at a large scale, and antivirus tools can be used to identify
infected clients in retrospect. Domains, by contrast, have to be labeled individually
after forensic analysis. We explore transfer learning based on sluice networks; this
allows the detection models to bootstrap each other. In a large-scale experimental
study, we find that the model outperforms known reference models and detects
previously unknown malware, previously unknown malware families, and previously
unknown malicious domains.
1 Introduction
Malware violates users’ privacy, harvests passwords and personal information, can
encrypt users’ files for ransom, is used to commit click-fraud, and to promote political
agendas by popularizing specific content in social media (Kogan, 2015). Client-based
antivirus tools use vendor-specific blends of signature-based analysis, static analysis of
portable-executable files, emulation (partial execution without access to actual system
resources prior to execution in the actual operating system) and dynamic, behavior-
based analysis to detect malware (Swinnen and Mesbahi, 2014). Network-traffic
analysis complements antivirus software and is widely used in corporate networks.
Traffic analysis allows organizations to enforce acceptable-use and security policies
consistently throughout the network and minimize management overhead. Traffic
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analysis makes it possible to encapsulate malware detection into network devices or
cloud services that can detect polymorphic malware (Karim et al., 2005) as well as
yet-unknown malware based on, for instance, URL patterns (Bartos and Sofka, 2015).
However, malware can easily prevent the analysis of its HTTP payload by using
the encrypted HTTPS protocol. The use of HTTPS by itself is not conspicuous
because Google, Facebook, LinkedIn, and many other popular sites encrypt their
network traffic by default and the global data volume of HTTPS has surpassed that
of HTTP (Finley, 2017). In order to subject HTTPS traffic to network-traffic analysis,
organizations today have to configure their network such that all web traffic is routed
via a web-security server. This server’s root certificate has to be installed as a trusted
certificate on all client computers, which allows the service to act as a man-in-the-
middle between client and host. It can decrypt, inspect, and re-encrypt HTTPS
requests. This approach scales poorly to large networks because the cryptographic
operations are computationally expensive, and it introduces a potential vulnerability
into the network.
Without breaking the encryption, an observer of HTTPS traffic can only see the
client and host IP addresses and ports, and the timestamps and data volumes of
packets. Network devices aggregate TCP/IP packets exchanged between a pair of IP
addresses and ports into a network flow for which address, timing, and data-volume
information are saved to a log file. Most of the time, an observer can also see the
unencrypted host domain name. The HTTP payload, including the HTTP header
fields and the URL, are encrypted.
Web hosts are involved in a wide range of illegitimate activities, and blacklisting
traffic to and from known malicious domains and IP addresses is an effective mech-
anism against malware. Malicious domains can host back-ends for banking trojans
and financial scams, click-fraud servers, or distribution hubs for malicious content.
Identifying a domain as malicious requires a complex forensic analysis. An analyst has
to collect information about the server that hosts the domain, software and employed
technologies, and can research ownership of the domain and co-hosted domains as
well as observe the host’s behavior.
Since many types of malicious activities involve interaction with client-based
malware, the detection of malicious hosts and infected clients are coupled prob-
lems. In the context of neural networks, labeled data for related tasks are often
exploited by designing coupled networks that share part of the parameters. In sluice
networks (Ruder et al., 2017), the extent to which parameters are shared is itself
controlled by parameters, which allows auxiliary data to serve as a flexible prior for
the task at hand.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews related work. We
describe our operating environment and our data in Section 3 and the problem setting
in Section 4. In Section 5, we derive a model for joint detection for malware and
malicious domains and describe reference methods. Section 6 presents experiments;
Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Work
Prior work on the analysis of HTTP logs (Nguyen and Armitage, 2008) has addressed
the problems of identifying command-and-control servers (Nelms et al., 2013), unsu-
pervised detection of malware (Kohout and Pevny, 2015b; Bartos et al., 2016), and
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supervised detection of malware using domain blacklists as labels (Franc et al., 2015;
Bartos and Sofka, 2015). HTTP log files contain the full URL string, from which a
wide array of informative features can be extracted (Bartos and Sofka, 2015).
A body of recent work has aimed at detecting Android malware by network-traffic
analysis. Arora et al. (2014) use the average packet size, average flow duration, and
a small set of other features to identify a small set of 48 malicious Android apps
with some accuracy. Lashkari et al. (2015) collect 1,500 benign and 400 malicious
Android apps, extract flow duration and volume feature, and apply several several
machine-learning algorithms from the Weka library. They observe high accuracy
values on the level of individual flows. Demontis et al. (2018) model different types of
attacks against such detection mechanisms and devise a feature-learning paradigm
that mitigates these attacks. Malik and Kaushal (2016) aggregate the VirusTotal
ranking of an app with a crowd-sourced domain-reputation service (Web of Trust)
and the app’s resource permission to arrive at a ranking.
Prior work on HTTPS logs has aimed at identifying the application layer proto-
col (Wright et al., 2006; Crotti et al., 2007; Dusi et al., 2009). In order to cluster web
servers that host similar applications, Kohout and Pevny (2015a) develop features
that are derived from a histogram of observable time intervals and data volumes
of connections. Using this feature representation, Lokocˇ et al. (2016) develop an
approximate k-NN classifier that identifies servers which are contacted by malware.
Hosts that are contacted by malware are by no means necessarily malicious. Malware
uses URL forwarding and other techniques to route its traffic via legitimate hosts, and
may contact legitimate services just to dilute its network traffic. We will nevertheless
use the histogram features as a reference feature representation.
Graph-based classification methods (e.g., Anderson et al., 2011) have been ex-
plored but cannot be applied in our operating environment. In our operating en-
vironment, a Cloud Web Security server observes only the network traffic within
an organization. In order to perceive a significant portion of the network graph,
companies would have to exchange their network-traffic data which is impractical for
logistic and privacy reasons.
Prior work on neural networks for network-flow analysis (Pevny and Somol, 2016)
has worked with labels for client computers (infected and not infected)—which leads
to a multi-instance learning problem. By contrast, our operating environment allows
us to observe the association between flows and executable files. Malware detection
from HTTPS traffic has been studied using a combination of word2vec embeddings of
domain names and long short term memory networks (LSTMs) (Prasse et al., 2017).
We will use this method as a reference in our experiments. Recent findings suggest
that the greater robustness of convolutional neural networks (CNNs) outweights the
ability of LSTMs to account for long-term dependencies (Gehring et al., 2017). This
motivates us to explore convolutional architectures. Neural networks have also been
applied to static malware analysis (Pascanu et al., 2015).
In the context of deep learning, multi-task learning is most often implemented via
hard or soft parameter sharing of hidden layers. In hard parameter sharing, models for
all task can share the convolutional layers (Long and Wang, 2015) or even all hidden
layers (Caruana, 1993), which can dramatically increase the sample size used to
optimize most of the parameters (Baxter, 1997). Soft parameter sharing, by contrast,
can be realized as a direct application of hierarchical Bayesian modeling to neural
network: each parameter is regularized towards its mean value across all tasks (Duong
et al., 2015; Yang and Hospedales, 2016). Cross-stitch (Misra et al., 2016) and sluice
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networks (Ruder et al., 2017) allow the extent of task coupling for separate parts of
the network to be controlled by parameters. Sluice networks have a slightly more
general form than cross-stitch networks because they have additional parameters that
allow a task-specific weighting of network layers.
Alternative transfer-learning approaches for neural networks enforce an inter-
mediate representation that is invariant across tasks (Ganin et al., 2016). Outside
of deep learning, the group lasso regularizer enforces subspace sharing, and wide
range of approaches to multi-task learning have been studied, based on hierarchical
Bayesian models (e.g., Finkel and Manning, 2009), learning task-invariant features
(e.g., Argyriou et al., 2007), task-similarity kernels (Evgeniou et al., 2005), and
learning instance-specific weights (e.g., Bickel et al., 2008).
3 Operating Environment
This section describes our application environment. In order to protect all computers
of an organization, a Cloud Web Security (CWS) service provides an interface between
the organization’s private network and the internet. Client computers establish a VPN
connection to the CWS service, and all external HTTP and HTTPS connections from
any client within the organization is then routed via this service. The service can block
HTTP and HTTPS requests based on the host domain and on the organization’s
acceptable-use policy. The CWS service blocks all traffic to and from all malicious
domains on a curated blacklist. It issues warnings when it has detected malware on a
client. Since security analysts have to process the malware warnings, the proportion
of false alarms among all issued warnings has to be small.
On the application layer, HTTPS uses the HTTP protocol, but all messages
are encrypted via the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol or its predecessor,
the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol. The CWS service aggregates all TCP/IP
packets between a single client computer, client port, host IP address, and host port
that result from a single HTTP request or from the TLS/SSL tunnel of an HTTPS
request into a network flow. For each network flow, a line is written into the log
file that includes data volume, timestamp, client and host address, and duration
information. For unencrypted HTTP traffic, this line also contains the full URL string.
For HTTPS traffic, it includes the domain name—if that name can be observed via
one of the following mechanisms.
Clients that use the Server Name Indication protocol extension (SNI) publish the
unencrypted host-domain name when they establish the connection. SNI is widely
used because it is necessary to verify certificates of servers that host multiple domains,
as most web servers do. When the network uses a transparent DNS proxy (Blum
and Lueker, 2001), this server caches DNS request-response pairs and can map IP
addresses to previously resolved domain names. The resulting sequence of log-file
lines serves as input to the detection models for malware and malicious domains.
3.1 Data Collection
For our experiments, we combine a large collection of HTTPS network flows (Prasse
et al., 2017) that have been labeled by whether they originate from a malicious or
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legitimate application with a domain blacklist that is maintained by forensics experts
at Cisco.
Prasse et al. (2017) have collected the HTTPS network flows that pass CWS
servers in 340 corporate networks. The client computers in these networks run a
VPN client that monitors the process table and network interface, and keeps a record
of which executable file creates each network flow. In retrospect, the executable
files have been analyzed with a multitude of antivirus tools. The resulting data set
consists of network flows between known clients (identified by organization and VPN
account), domains (fully qualified domain names), data volumes and timestamps, and
a label that indicates whether the application that generated the traffic is recognized
as malware by antivirus tools. We stratify training and test data in chronological
order. The training data contains the complete HTTPS traffic of 171 small to large
computer networks for a period of 5 days in July 2016. The test data contains the
complete HTTPS traffic of 169 different computer networks for a period of 8 days in
September 2016. Forensics experts at Cisco continuously investigate suspicious host
names, second-level domain names, and server IP addresses that have been flagged
by a wide range of mechanisms. This includes an analysis of the hosted software
and employed technologies, of registry records, URL and traffic patterns, and any
additional information that may be available for a particular domain. We believe that
domains are almost never erroneously rated as malicious, but due to the expensive
analytic process, the blacklist of malicious domains is necessarily incomplete. All
traffic from and to malicious serves can easily be blocked by the CWS service. The
network traffic does not contain any flows to domains that had been on our blacklist
at the time when the traffic data were collected. The traffic data set contains network
flows to and from 4,340 malicious host names, second-level domains, and server IP
addresses that have been added to the blacklist after the data were collected.
3.2 Quantitative Analysis of the Data
Table 1 and Table 2 summarizes the number of benign and malicious network
flows, client computers, infected computers, applications with unique hashes, and
organizations.
Table 3 gives statistics about the most frequent malware families. It enumerates
the number of variations that occur, the number of infected clients, and, in parentheses,
the number of infected clients in the training data.
In total, just below 18,000 computers are malware-infected and communicate
with domains that had not been blacklisted at the time, which corresponds to almost
0.6%.
In the traffic data, 4,340 domains occur that have been added to the blacklist
after the traffic data were recorded. Table 4 details the types of malicious host names,
second-level domains, and server IP addresses that occur in all data and in the
training data.
4 Problem Setting
We will now establish the problem setting. Our goal is to flag client computers that are
hosting malware, and to flag malicious web domains. Client computers are identified
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Table 1 Key statistics of the HTTPS network-traffic data sets.
data set flows malicious benign users infected organizations
training 44,348,879 350,220 43,150,605 133,437 8,944 171
test 149,005,149 955,037 142,592,850 177,738 8,971 169
Table 2 Number of applications in HTTPS network-traffic data sets.
data set applications malicious
training 20,169 1,168
test 27,264 1,237
Table 3 Malware families and malware types.
malware family variations clients
dealply 506 1,385 (516)
softcnapp 119 797 (250)
crossrider 98 274 (102)
elex 86 779 (316)
opencandy 57 164 (126)
conduit 56 314 (103)
browsefox 52 78 (34)
speedingupmypc 29 224 (63)
kraddare 28 33 (26)
installcore 27 49 (19)
mobogenie 26 467 (184)
pullupdate 25 99 (25)
iobit downloader 24 38 (15)
asparnet 24 5,267 (5,128)
Table 4 Domain-label statistics
type total training
malware-distribution 2730 478
ad-injector 961 576
malicious-content-distribution 276 171
potentially unwanted application 97 75
click-fraud 65 50
spam-tracking 61 51
information-stealer 52 22
scareware 30 23
money-scam 22 9
banking-trojan 19 10
malicious-advertising 13 10
cryptocurrency-miner 9 0
ransomware 3 3
anonymization-software 2 1
by a (local) IP address and a VPN user name; web domains are identified by a fully
qualified domain name or, when no domain name can be observed, an IP address.
We have two types of classification instances. For each interval of 24 hours, we
count every client computer that establishes at least one network connection as a
separate classification instance of the malware-detection problem. A client that is
active on multiple days constitutes multiple classification instances; this allows us to
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issue daily infection warnings for clients. Equivalently, for each interval of 24 hours,
we model each observed fully qualified domain name as a classification instance. This
allows us to make daily blacklisting decisions, and to disregard traffic after 24 hours
in the deployed system.
Our training data are labeled at the granularity of a network flow between a client
and a host. This allows us to train classification models at the granularity of network
flows. Learning a network-flows classifier from labeled flows is an intrinsically easier
problem than learning a detection model from labels at the granularity level of clients
or domains. While a detection model that is trained from labeled clients or domains
has to figure out which flows pertain to the malicious activity, the network-flow
classification model is handed that information during training.
Since a client is infected if it is running at least one malicious application and
a domain is malicious if it engages in at least one malicious activity, it is natural
to aggregate the classification results for network flows into detection results for
clients and domains by max-pooling the decision-function values over all flows for that
client or domain, respectively, throughout the period of 24 hours. The flow classifiers
are thereby applied as one-dimensional convolutions over time; max-pooling the
outcome yields detection models for infected clients and malicious domains. Since an
application generally generates multiple network flows, it may be helpful to take the
context into account when classifying each flow. Our input representation therefore
includes a window of the client’s flows that is centered over the flow to be classified.
The width of this window is a model parameter. This window always contains the
context of network flows for a client, both for detection of malware and of malicious
domains. While the CWS server can observe the complete traffic of each client in
the network, it will generally only observe a small fraction of traffic to and from a
domain outside the network.
We will measure precision-recall curves because they are most directly linked to
the merit of a detection method from an application point of view. Precision—the
fraction of alarms that are not false alarms—is directly linked to unnecessary workload
imposed on security analysts, while recall quantifies the detection rate. However, since
precision-recall curves are not invariant in the class ratio, we will additionally use
ROC curves to compare the performance of classifiers on data sets with varying class
ratios. Note that the relationship between false-positive rate and precision depends
on the class ratio. For instance, at a false-positive rate of 10%, the expected number
of false alarms equals 10% of the number of benign instances; hence, false alarms
would by far outnumber actual detections. By contrast, at a precision of 90%, only
10% of all alarms would be false alarms.
5 Network-Flow Analysis
This section presents our architecture that jointly detects infected clients and malicious
domains, as well as reference models that we will compare against.
5.1 Sluice Network
Figure 1 shows the sluice network architecture for joint flow classification with soft
parameter sharing. The left-hand part of the network classifies flows by whether
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Fig. 1 Sluice Dense on Domain CNN
Fig. 2 Domain CNN architecture
they originate from infected clients, the right-hand part classifies flows by whether
they are between a client and a malicious domain. The input features are derived
from a window of 2k + 1 flows for a given client that is centered around the flow to
be classified. The first stage of the network—the domain-name CNNs—receives the
domain names of the host domains within that window as input.
Figure 2 shows this domain-name CNN in more detail. It has a standard con-
volutional architecture with convolutional, max-pooling, and dense layers. Domain
names are first represented as one-hot-encoded character sequences of the up to
40 last characters of a domain name. We selected the value of 40 because further
increasing this parameter does not change the experimental results. In the next
step, an embedding layer reduces this dimensionality; weights are shared for the
embedding of each character. This is followed by a one-dimensional convolutional
layer, a max-pooling layer, and a dense layer that constitutes the final encoding of
the domain name.
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The following dense layers receive the window of 2k+ 1 domain-name embeddings.
Additionally, they receive a vector of numeric features for each of the 2k + 1 flows in
the input window. The numeric attributes consist of the log-transformed duration,
log-transformed numbers of sent and received bytes, duration, and the time gap from
the preceding flow. These dense layers are followed by softmax output layers.
After each stage, the output from either side of the network is combined into a
weighted average controlled by coupling coefficients α. Values of α·,· = 0 correspond
to independent networks. In addition, the output layer is allowed to draw on all
intermediate layers. The output of each hidden layer is weighted by a coefficient β
and all weighted outputs are concatenated. Setting all the β· values associated with
the first hidden layer to zero and all values associated with the second hidden layer to
one correspond to the standard layered feed-forward architecture. We use the ReLU
activation function for hidden layers.
The model is trained by using backpropagation on labeled network flows. At
application time, detection results at the level of clients and domains are derived by
maximizing the output scores of the positive class “infected client” over all network
flows between the given client and any domain over an interval of 24 hours. A client
is flagged as soon at this maximum exceeds a threshold value. Likewise, the output
scores of the positive class “malicious domain” on the right-hand side is maximized
over all flows between any client and the domain to be classified for 24 hours.
5.2 Independent Models and Hard Sharing
Separating the left- and right-hand side of the sluice architecture constitutes the
first natural baseline. We will refer to these models as independent models. This is
equivalent to setting α·,· = 0, setting all the β· values associated with the first hidden
layer to zero and all values associated with the second hidden layer to one. The next
natural baseline is hard parameter sharing. Here, only the output layers of the client-
and domain-classification models have independent parameters while the domain
CNN and the following dense layer exist only once.
5.3 LSTM on Word2vec
This baseline model (Prasse et al., 2017) uses the word2vec continuous bag-of-words
model (Mikolov et al., 2013) to embed domain names, and processes the flow sequence
with an LSTM. The input to the network consists of character n-grams that are
one-hot coded as a binary vector in which each dimension represents an n-gram. The
input layer is fully connected to a hidden layer that implements the embedding. The
same weight matrix is applied to all input character n-grams. The activation of the
hidden units is the vector-space representation of the input n-gram of characters. In
order to infer the vector-space representation of an entire domain-name, an “averaging
layer” averages the hidden-unit activations of all its character n-grams.
We use the weight matrix and configuration of Prasse et al. (2017) and refer to this
model as LSTM on word2vec. This model uses character 2-grams, resulting in 1,583
character 2-grams. Prasse et al. (2017) have found the LSTM on word2vec model to
outperform a random-forest model. We therefore consider LSTM on word2vec to be
our reference and do not include random forests in our experiments.
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Table 5 Best hyperparameters found using hyperband for models with shared blocks.
Sluice Hard parameter sharing
hyperparameter value hyperparameter value
D
om
ai
n
C
N
N
embedding size 128 embedding size 64
kernel size 16 kernel size 16
filters 512 filters 512
dense units 256 dense units 64
F
lo
w
cl
as
s. dense units 512 dense units 512
window size 11 window size 7
Table 6 Best hyperparameters found using hyperband for independent models.
Independent client Independent domain
hyperparameter value hyperparameter value
D
om
ai
n
C
N
N
embedding size 64 embedding size 64
kernel size 16 kernel size 16
filters 128 filters 128
dense units 32 dense units 32
F
lo
w
cl
as
s. dense units 512 dense units 512
window size 9 window size 9
5.4 Metric Space Learning
Lokocˇ et al. (2016) extract a vector of soft histogram features for the flows between
any client and a given domain. They apply a k-NN classifier in order to identify
domains that are contacted by malware. We apply this approach to our problem
of detecting malicious domains. We use exact inference instead of the approximate
inference proposed by Lokocˇ et al. (2016). We prop this baseline up by additionally
providing a list of engineered domain features described by Franc et al. (2015) as
input to the classifier; we refer to this method as 4-NN soft histograms.
6 Experiments
This section reports on malware-detection and malicious-domain-detection accuracy.
We train all models on a single server with 40-core Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-
2640 processor and 128 GB of memory. We train all neural networks using the
Keras (Chollet et al., 2015) and Tensorflow (Abadi et al., 2015) libraries on a GeForce
GTX TITAN X GPU using the NVidia CUDA platform. We implement the evaluation
framework using the scikit-learn (Pedregosa et al., 2011) machine learning package.
6.1 Parameter Optimization
We optimize the hyperparameters of all networks on the training data using the
hyperband algorithm (Li et al., 2016). For the domain CNN, we vary the embedding
size between 25 and 27, the kernel size between 2 and 24, the number of filters between
2 and 29, and the number of dense units between 25 and 29. For the sluice network,
the independent models and hard parameter sharing, we vary the number of dense
units between 25 and 211, and the window size between 1 and 15 flows. Table 5 and
Table 6 shows the hyperparameter values after optimization.
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(a) Precision-recall curves (b) ROC curves (log-scale for FPR)
Fig. 3 Detection of infected clients.
(a) Precision-recall curves (b) ROC curves (log-scale for FPR)
Fig. 4 Detection of malicious domains.
6.2 Infected Clients: Performance
We train the models on the training data and evaluate them on test data that was
recorded after the training data. Figure 3 compares precision-recall and ROC curves;
curves are averaged over 10 random restarts with Glorot initialization, colored bands
visualize plus and minus one standard error.
For malware detection, the sluice network, the independent models and hard
parameter sharing differ only marginally in performance. All three detect 40% of
malware with a precision of 80%. Based on Welch’s t-test with significance level
α = 0.05, at false-positive rates of 10−4 and 10−3, the sluice network is still significantly
better than the independent model (p = 0.021 for 10−4 and p = 0.008 for 10−3), but
the difference between sluice and hard parameter sharing is not significant. LSTM
over word2vec clearly performs substantially worse.
6.3 Malicious Domains: Performance
Figure 4 compares the model’s performance for detection of malicious domains. Here,
the precision-recall and ROC curves of the sluice network look favorable compared
to the baselines. Intuitively, since there are fewer malicious domains in the training
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(a) Infected clients: different malware families. (b) Infected clients: types of malware.
(c) Malicious domains: subgroups of domains. (d) Malicious domains: subgroups of domains.
Fig. 5 Sluice network on subgroups of instances, ROC curves for infected clients (left figure)
and malicious domains (right figures).
data than there are infected clients, it is plausible that malicious-domain detection
benefits more strongly from transfer learning. The 4-NN soft histogram baseline
performs substantially worse. The precision-recall curve becomes noisy near a recall
of zero because for a low recall, the precision estimate is based on a small number of
positives, and the decision function assumes a high value for several true and false
positives.
Based on Welch’s t-test with significance level α = 0.05, at a false-positive rate of
10−4, the sluice network performs significantly better than both the independent model
(p = 0.028) and hard parameter sharing. At 10−3, the sluice network outperforms
the independent model (p = 0.001); it detects 40% of all malicious domains almost
without false alarms. The difference between sluice and hard parameter sharing is
not significant.
6.4 Detailed Analysis
In this section, we study how the detection models perform on specific subgroups
of clients and domains. We train a single model on all training data. In order to
determine the performance for specific types of instances, we skip all other positive
instances in the evaluation data. Since the class ratios vary widely between subgroups,
we compare ROC curves. Figure 5(a) shows that the most popular malware families
can be detected more easily, which corresponds to their high prevalence in the training
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data. Perhaps surprisingly, we see that the model detects unknown variations of known
malware families as well as unknown malware families—that is, malware families
for which no representative is present in the training data—almost as accurately
as known malware. Figure 5(b) shows that the model’s performance is just slightly
better for the highly prevalent potentially unwanted applications (“PUA”) than it
is for malware. We also see that malware which does not contact any domain that
occurs in the training data (labeled “unknown domains”) is detected with comparable
accuracy to malware that contacts known domains.
Figures 5(c and d) show how the sluice network performs on specific types of
malicious domains. Here, we see that the detection performance uniformly depends
on the prevalence of the domain type in the training data. Only 10 backends for
banking trojans are included in the training data, and no single cryptocurrency-mining
backend. Malware-distribution servers are almost impossible for the model to detect,
despite being the second-most frequent type of malicious domains in the training
data. But a detailed analysis shows that the training data contains only 1,447 flows
(out of more than 44 million) from malware-distribution servers; so at the level of
flows, this class is actually rare.
6.5 Additional Experiments
We carry out additional experiments but omit the detailed results for brevity. The
independent models differ from LSTM on word2vec in two aspects: the use of the
domain-name CNN instead of a word2vec embedding, and the choice of processing
windows of network flows in a convolutional way with max-pooling over all window
positions instead of an LSTM. In order to explore whether performance differences
are due to the different domain-name embedding or the different handling of the
time-series input as additionally experiment with the intermediate form of dense
on word2vec. We find that while this architecture performs significantly better than
LSTM on word2vec, it still performs much worse than independent models.
The 4-NN soft histogram model (Lokocˇ et al., 2016) originally does not use the
engineered domain features (Franc et al., 2015) that we provide it with. We find that
using the 4-NN model without the domain features (or using the domain features
without the histogram features) deteriorates the results. We also find that combining
the soft-histogram features and engineered domain features with a random forest
improves the result over the 4-NN classifier, but its performance remains substantially
below the performance of all neural networks. Finally, we find that adding additional
convolutional and max-pooling layers or replacing the dense layer in the sluice network
with convolutional and max-pooling layers deteriorates its performance.
7 Conclusion
Detection of malware-infected clients and malicious domains allows organizations to
use a centralized security solution that establishes a uniform security level across
the organization with minimal administrative overhead. A specifically prepared VPN
client makes it possible to collect large amounts of HTTPS network traffic and label
network flows in retrospect by whether they originate from malware. This makes it
possible to employ relatively high-capacity prediction models. By contrast, malicious
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domains have to be identified by means of an expensive forensic analysis. We have
developed a method that jointly detects infected clients and malicious domains from
encrypted network traffic without compromising the encryption.
We can draw a number of conclusions. All network architectures that we study
improve on the previous state of the art by a large margin. We find that transfer
learning using a sluice network improves malware-detection—for which we have a
large body of training data—slightly over learning independent networks. Transfer
learning allows us to leverage the large body of malware training data to improve the
detection of malicious domains. The sluice network detects 40% of all malware with a
precision of 80% using only encrypted HTTPS network traffic—at this threshold level,
20% of all alarms are false alarms. In practice, each alarm triggers the notification
of a security analyst; if 80% of the notifications indicate an actual security breach,
an analyst will not get the impression that the notification system can be ignored.
The sluice network detects new variants of known malware families and malware of
families that have not yet been known at training time with nearly the same accuracy.
This finding is remarkable because signature-based antivirus tools cannot detect such
malware. The network also detects 40% of all malicious domains with a precision
of nearly 1. Given the high costs of a manual analysis of domains, this result has a
potentially high impact for network security in practice.
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